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Introduction
The EU has been increasing its role in financial regulation over the 
last four decades. At first, the main focus was on promoting trade 
within the union in a way compatible with the four freedoms: the 
free movement of goods, services, capital and people. As part of 
this agenda, the EU prohibited member states from introducing 
certain forms of regulation that inhibited free trade in services 
and the free movement of capital. Attempts to promote consist-
ency of regulation tended to involve a process known as ‘mutual 
recognition’. In other words, member states were broadly free to 
develop their own regulatory frameworks within which financial 
institutions operated; companies from one member state could 
then operate freely in other member states whilst being regu-
lated by their home state. In discussing how regulation at the EU 
level has become detached from the original founding principles 
of the EU, this chapter will focus on the regulation of insurance 
services, though there will also be some discussion of other non-
bank financial services. Banking is covered in Chapter 12.
Insurance often gets dwarfed in popular press discussion by 
debates over the banking sector. However, the insurance sector 
in the UK is the largest in the EU and makes up 7 per cent of the 
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total world market, employs 320,000 people and is responsible 
for the investment of £1.8 trillion.2 A narrowly defined measure 
of non-bank financial services is only slightly smaller in terms 
of contribution to national income than the contribution of the 
banking sector defined widely; in turn, insurance is the largest 
sector within non-bank financial services.3 
Elements of this mutual recognition approach remain with 
regard to trade in insurance services. The principle of EU law 
is still that insurance companies domiciled in one EU country 
can conduct business elsewhere in the EU under supervision of 
the home state. However, the European financial regulator now 
has an overarching authority. Furthermore – and much more 
importantly – more powers have accrued to the central authori-
ties within the EU, and, as a result, regulation is in the process of 
becoming harmonised.
From 2011, supervision of financial services began on a pan-
EU basis. The EU financial regulatory authority is made up of 
three supervisory bodies: the European Banking Authority 
(EBA), the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) 
and the European Insurance and occupational Pensions Au-
thority ( EIoPA). The desire of these organisations to centralise 
regulation is clear. For example, the EBA states: ‘Whilst the na-
tional supervisory authorities remain in charge of supervising 
individual financial institutions, the objective of the European 
supervisory authorities is to improve the functioning of the in-
ternal market by ensuring appropriate, efficient and harmonised 
European regulation and supervision.’ ESMA notes that it aims 
to create a unified rule book. In the field of insurance, the Sol-
vency II agenda is unifying regulation at the EU level. In effect, 
2 See https://www.abi.org.uk/~/media/Files/Documents/Publications/Public/ 
Migrated/Facts%20and%20figures%20data/UK%20Insurance%20Key%20
Facts%202012.ashx (accessed 31 July 2014).
3 See Burgess (2011). The measure of banking output includes anything that is pro-
duced by banks, even if the services are not banking services as such.
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national regulators are becoming subsidiaries of the EU regu-
latory bodies.
It is argued in this chapter that unifying regulation is not nec-
essary to promote free trade in insurance and other non-bank 
financial services. Although unified regulation might reduce the 
transactions costs of trade between countries, it does not neces-
sarily promote a better business environment in general, as a 
higher level of regulation may reduce overall economic activity 
in financial services. It is concluded that it would be perfectly 
reasonable for groups of states to develop unified approaches to 
regulation outside the remit of the EU if they believed that doing 
so would reduce costs and bring other benefits. However, the role 
of the EU, enforced through the ECJ, should simply be to ensure 
that national regulations do not impede or significantly distort 
trade: the EU should not create a level playing field or harmonise 
regulation.
The regulation of insurance companies pre-1970
The justifications for insurance company regulation are different 
from those for banking regulation. Systemic risk is a much less 
important consideration in insurance.4 Instead, issues such as 
dealing with information asymmetries and enforcing opaque 
contracts are much more important (see Booth and Morrison 
2007). Furthermore, though there are protection schemes for 
customers of insurance companies – akin to deposit insurance 
schemes – they do not have the same importance as deposit in-
surance schemes in banking. The winding-up of failed insurance 
companies is normally much easier than the resolution of banks, 
and, especially in the case of life insurance, there is less time 
pressure when winding-up an insurance company.
4 The UK’s insurance regulator, the Prudential Regulation Authority, states: ‘Nev-
ertheless it is clear that insurers are not systemic in the same way as banks.’ See 
Debbage (2013).
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Insurance markets in the UK were regulated between 1870 
and Britain’s entry into the then common market by a set of 
principles that were established in the 1870 Life Assurance 
Companies Act (see Booth 2007). Although it was amended and 
consolidated on various occasions, its basic principles remained 
clear for 100 years. A deposit was required for new entrants into 
the insurance market; all companies had to publish actuarial 
reports and publish the basis upon which those reports were 
calculated (though no specific basis was required); and a special 
mechanism was adopted for winding up failed insurance compa-
nies. These principles, whilst remaining in place for over a cen-
tury, gradually evolved to give greater powers to the regulator 
(generally the Board of Trade) to intervene in the affairs of the 
company if an insurance company was close to insolvency. The 
1870 Act was certainly very successful in the sense that it was 
not intrusive – except in one respect5 – and led to a long period 
of very stable insurance markets, especially in the life insurance 
sector. 
The EU, the single market and free trade
Entry into the common market meant that UK insurance regula-
tion had to be compatible with EEC regulation. In the early days 
of British membership, EEC regulation had two main aims. The 
first was to ensure that insurance regulation in member states 
was lightly coordinated. The second was to allow insurance 
companies in one member state to transact businesses in other 
member states.
In these early stages, there were various European require-
ments that had to be fulfilled, but the principle was one of ‘mutual 
recognition’, though that term was not always used explicitly. In 
5 The deposit requirement may well have prevented new entry by small companies.
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essence, there were some basic EU6 regulatory principles that 
had to be enshrined in the laws of member states, but, beyond 
that, an insurance company domiciled in one country (say, the 
UK) could do business in another EU country (say, Belgium) 
through a branch whilst being regulated from the UK.
The basic EU regulatory principles included an explicit mar-
gin of solvency and some other regulations that were adopted by 
the UK in the Insurance Companies Regulations 1981.7 These EU 
regulations did not add substantially to the regulatory burden 
in the UK, although it could be argued that their arcane, opaque 
and obsolete nature helped reinforce the mismanagement of 
Equitable Life, which was closed to new business because of its 
solvency position in 2000. Certainly, the adoption of EU regula-
tion by the UK accelerated the erosion of what had been known 
as the ‘freedom with publicity’ approach to insurance regulation, 
which was enshrined in the 1870 Act.
Nevertheless, this system of mutual recognition allowed – in-
deed encouraged – regulatory competition. If insurance compa-
nies were over-regulated in Denmark, for example, it was possible 
for a UK company to establish a branch in Denmark, regulated 
by the UK Board of Trade, and sell into the Danish market. of 
course, if customers preferred the more stringent regulation of 
the Danish insurance companies, they could still buy policies 
issued by Danish companies.8
There were certainly very wide differences between regulatory 
regimes in the EU at that time. The differences in regulation are 
summarised by the following quotation:
6 Henceforth, ‘EU’ will be used to describe what is now called the European Union – it 
having gone through various name changes since Britain joined.
7 These related to the valuation of assets and liabilities.
8 Consumer protection issues were not covered by EU competences, so UK compa-
nies operating branches still had to obtain product approval in some of the more 
dirigiste regimes.
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[In the] U.K., Ireland and to some extent the Netherlands a lib-
eral system of supervision of insurance operates … At the other 
extreme is West Germany and the Scandinavian countries. The 
guiding principle there is one of tight supervision on conserva-
tive bases as the best means of protecting consumers (Ferguson 
et al. 1989: 455). 
The later Third Life Directive, which had to be implemented by 
1994, arguably strengthened the principle of regulatory compe-
tition, whilst, in general, promoting deregulation by prohibiting 
some forms of insurance regulation. For example, under this di-
rective, a member state was not allowed to require foreign firms 
selling business to obtain approval for policy terms or impose 
restrictive conditions on the investment of assets (especially in 
relation to government bonds). These were prohibitions on reg-
ulation that were designed to promote trade and should not be 
seen as intrusive regulations.9 It could certainly be argued that 
the Third Life Directive (and the associated directive in relation 
to non-life insurance) was a step towards a free-trade environ-
ment in which an insurer domiciled in one country could operate 
without hindrance in another EU country; it also encouraged de-
regulation in certain member states.
The beginning of the end of mutual recognition and 
deregulation
The European Commission regarded the situation that existed 
under the Third Life Directive as unsatisfactory because it in-
hibited, in its view, the development of the single market. In the 
Commission’s words:
9 See, for example, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_P-91-8_en.htm (accessed 4 
September 2015).
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The rationale for EU insurance legislation is to facilitate the de-
velopment of a Single Market in insurance services, whilst at the 
same time securing an adequate level of consumer protection … 
Many Member States have concluded that the current EU min-
imum requirements are not sufficient and have implemented 
their own reforms, thus leading to a situation where there is a 
patchwork of regulatory requirements across the EU. This ham-
pers the functioning of the Single Market.10
It can certainly be argued that the Third Life Directive has not 
been a success in terms of encouraging the writing of cross-bor-
der insurance business. Figures are not available for the life 
insurance industry, but in 2010 the non-life insurance industry 
wrote only £731 million of cross-border business through branch-
es rather than separately regulated subsidiaries:11 this compared 
with over £22 billion of premium income written by Lloyds of 
London alone in 201012 and £13 billion of premium income writ-
ten by a single insurance company (Aviva) through separately 
regulated non-UK subsidiaries in 2013. The value added by the 
EU cross-border insurance business under the Single European 
Passport is clearly tiny. However, there is a vast amount of trade 
in insurance services both within the EU and outside, but with-
out using the single passport system
There are three logical responses to this situation. First, we 
could regard the mutual recognition and single passport ap-
proach as a ‘bit-part player’ that is complementary to the free-
dom of all EU insurance companies to establish subsidiaries in 
all other EU countries and be regulated by the country in which 
10 See http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/insurance/docs/solvency/solvency2/
faq_en.pdf (accessed 4 September 2015).
11 Figure from Association of British Insurers Data Bulletin, 2011.
12 http://www.lloyds.com/~/media/files/lloyds/investor%20relations/2010/annual 
%20results/files/ar2010.pdf (accessed 4 September 2015).
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the business is written. In other words, the EU could have just 
carried on with the existing system established under the Third 
Life Directive. Second, we could move in the direction chosen by 
the EU towards uniform regulation in all EU countries. Third, we 
could allow all countries to adopt their own independent regu-
latory frameworks. If the third approach were taken, trade in 
insurance services would only be possible through subsidiaries 
established in other member countries, but there would be no 
reason why pairs of countries or groups of countries should not 
choose to unify their regulation. This might be particularly bene-
ficial for smaller countries and countries that share similar legal 
frameworks, and it will be considered below.13 It certainly should 
not be thought, however, that free trade requires harmonisation 
of regulation, as is also discussed below.
From common market to single market, 
harmonisation and centralisation
The EU has been able to centralise financial regulation at the 
European level with few political obstacles. From January 2011, 
three European Supervisory Authorities became responsible for 
supervising financial services across the EU. For the insurance 
sector, the relevant supervisor is the EIoPA. It is very clear that 
it is the role of the EIoPA to draft a single set of regulations, and 
the role of national regulatory authorities is merely to supervise 
firms and ensure that they apply the EU-wide rule book.
13 In meetings I had with the Polish and Bulgarian ministries of finance in the early 1990s, 
it was interesting to note that the English translations of both the 1990 Polish Insur-
ance Law and the proposed Bulgarian Law (which, I believe, was never passed) were 
identical (with the same translation errors in both). Indeed, the proposed Bulgarian 
Law was probably translated into Bulgarian from the English translation of the Polish 
Law. Translation difficulties aside, this is a perfectly reasonable way for countries to 
move forward – adopting common regulatory frameworks if they so wish outside the 
structures of the EU.
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one example of the way in which regulation is being central-
ised is the new system of insurance capital regulation known as 
Solvency  II. This regulatory framework involves an extraordi-
narily complex system of calculating capital requirements that 
requires insurance companies to hold capital sufficient to ensure 
that they have, according to the models used, a probability of in-
solvency of less than one-in-200 over a one-year period. In taking 
this approach, those framing the regulation repeat exactly the 
same mistakes as the framers of the Basel approach to banking 
regulation (see De Soto (2009), and see below). The approach – 
which is largely incomprehensible except to the expert – requires 
exceptionally complicated rule books to deal with all types of 
business in 27 different countries. other pillars of Solvency  II 
require that insurance businesses are governed in a way that 
promotes effective risk management and enhances transparency 
and disclosure.
Whilst I do not approve of the new approach to insurance regu-
lation and believe it will do little to promote free trade, it is worth 
noting that, in the absence of the centralisation of EU insurance 
regulation, the UK regulator would probably have developed a 
similar regulatory framework to that being adopted in the EU. In-
deed, the UK has had substantial influence on the development of 
Solvency II. But the main purpose of this chapter is not to discuss 
the efficacy or otherwise of particular aspects of the EU regula-
tory system; it is to question the whole approach of centralising 
regulation at the EU level rather than allowing member states to 
determine their own approaches. The new labyrinthine regulatory 
system is merely an example of the effect of centralisation. 
Single market or free market?
As already noted, there is tension between the concepts of a 
free market and a single market. The two are not necessarily 
the same, though they were assumed to be by the Conservative 
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government that ratified the Single European Act in 1986.14 We 
are moving to a situation where the same regulations will apply 
across the financial sector and throughout the EU, but, at the 
same time, financial services companies will be heavily circum-
scribed everywhere within the EU. In other words, the market 
will be single but not free. Insurance is one notable example of 
this. Freedom to trade would be circumscribed – both within 
and between countries – by the restrictive regulatory framework 
that contrasts greatly with the tradition of ‘freedom with public-
ity’ and decentralised systems of regulation that existed in the 
UK until at least 1970. The whole philosophy of the UK insurance 
regulatory framework had been to allow insurance companies 
the freedom to do as they wished, as long as they explained what 
they were doing. 
As noted above, an alternative to unifying regulation would be 
to allow each country within the EU to regulate insurance com-
panies as they wished. At the same time, following the principle of 
free movement of services, any company from any country could 
be allowed to establish a subsidiary in another member country. 
A subsidiary of a UK company established in, for example, Spain 
would be regulated by, in that case, the Spanish regulator. That 
subsidiary could still buy services provided by the UK subsidiary, 
but the regulation of the business sold in Spain would be by the 
Spanish government.
14 See, for example, Mrs Thatcher speaking in 1988: ‘Action to get rid of the barriers. 
Action to make it possible for insurance companies to do business throughout 
the Community. Action to let people practice their trades and professions freely 
throughout the Community. Action to remove the customs barriers and formalities 
so that goods can circulate freely and without time-consuming delays. Action to 
make sure that any company could sell its goods and services without let or hin-
drance. Action to secure free movement of capital throughout the Community. All 
this is what Europe is now committed to do. In 1985 the Community’s Heads, Gov-
ernment gave a pledge to complete the single market by 1992. To make sure that it 
was not just a pious hope, they made that pledge part of the Treaty, as the Single 
European Act.’ http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/107219 (accessed 4 
September 2015).
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There would be no single market under this regime. There 
would be increased transactions costs from trade, and it is 
possible that freedom to trade could be circumscribed within 
countries that chose onerous regulatory regimes. However, this 
approach should not lead to discrimination between compa-
nies from different countries, and so freedom to trade between 
countries would be promoted, as long as subsidiaries were es-
tablished to conduct business. British companies establishing in 
Spain would be treated the same way as Spanish companies. Free 
trade would certainly still be possible, and trade could not be 
prohibited by member governments under EU law. For example, 
the French government could not prohibit a UK company from 
selling insurance services in France as long as the UK company 
set up a French subsidiary. The economic activity could still be 
undertaken in the UK through the mechanism of the French sub-
sidiary buying services from the UK head office: this happens in 
reverse with the offshoring of call centres by many UK insurance 
companies today. The benefits of trade and comparative advan-
tage would be retained, but there would be no single market. Any 
vexatious regulation that inhibited trade (for example, requiring 
insurance companies domiciled in Spain to invest all assets in 
Spanish bonds and Spanish listed companies, or requiring insur-
ance companies domiciled in Spain to only use Spanish-speak-
ing workers to provide policy-administration services) would not 
be permitted and should be overruled by the ECJ in enforcing the 
basic freedoms within the EU, using appropriate legislation to 
do so.
The costs and benefits of uniform EU regulation
The mechanisms put in place under the Single European Act have 
led directly to the centralisation of regulation. In the development 
of Solvency II, it appears that no attempt was made to promote 
regulatory competition using mutual recognition. Indeed, HM 
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Treasury (2008: 7) suggests that only two options were seriously 
considered by the European Commission in assessing the costs 
and benefits of Solvency II – one was to wait for an international 
solvency regime, and the other was the development of an EU 
solvency system. It appears that approaches that did not involve 
centralisation were not even considered – the only question was 
whether centralisation should be at the EU or at the world level. 
However, the problems of over-regulation that arise when regu-
lation is centralised at the EU level could have been anticipated: 
indeed, they were explained in Migue (1993).
If the central authority of a federation of states or regions is 
given the power to regulate, then interest groups can influence 
the use of that power for their own benefit and to undermine the 
comparative advantage of other member states – thus introduc-
ing trade distortions in a subtle way. We saw after the financial 
crisis, for example, the attempts by EU member states to im-
pose a financial transactions tax. If that had been enacted, this 
would have fallen disproportionately on the UK, with perhaps 
50 per cent of all revenues coming from the UK. As it happens, 
the imposition of such a tax was impossible because of the una-
nimity requirement on matters of taxation. Matters to do with 
insurance regulation can, however, be determined by qualified 
majority voting and, given the processes that were set in place 
in the Financial Services Action Plan (see Bank of England 2003), 
this means that the EU bureaucracy or a collection of states can 
effectively determine insurance regulation across the EU to the 
detriment of certain countries that have a comparative advan-
tage in insurance services, or to the detriment of consumers. The 
same applies to other areas of financial regulation (see below).
Vaubel (2007) shows how the institutions within the EU, post-
the Lisbon Treaty and enlargement, are especially susceptible 
to rent seeking and the tactic of ‘raising rivals’ costs’. After 2017, 
legislation can be passed by a qualified majority representing 
only 65 per  cent of the population of the EU (or 55 per  cent of 
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the member states). Migue (1993), recognising these problems, 
describes harmonisation of regulation as a ‘menace’ to true fed-
eralism, an impediment to freedom to trade and an impediment 
to ensuring that the appropriate regulatory environment is de-
veloped for each member state.
In addition to these problems, the adoption of uniform systems 
of regulation can make financial systems more prone to systemic 
risk. If the regulatory system fails, or if it distorts financial activ-
ity in the way that the Basel Accord encouraged securitisation in 
the banking system, for example, international regulation can in-
crease the likelihood of the whole system failing (see, for example, 
the chapter by Alexander in Booth (2009)). In this context, it is 
interesting that HM Treasury (2008) states explicitly: ‘Solvency II 
is based on a three-pillar approach used in the Basel  II banking 
accord.’ This document was published at the height of the banking 
crisis, without any apparent recognition of the failure of regula-
tion in that crisis. Swarup (2012) shows how the design of insur-
ance regulation under Solvency II is likely to encourage, perversely, 
insurance companies to invest in risky sovereign bonds. These 
incentives apply to all insurance companies in all EU countries, as 
they face the same regulatory requirements. If there should be a 
sovereign bond crisis, all EU insurers could be affected in the same 
way, given that the regulations will encourage herding.
Furthermore, a uniform approach to regulation, which re-
jects the concept of regulatory competition, also prevents us 
benefiting from a trial-and-error process, in which regulators in 
different countries can learn from the successes and mistakes 
of others. There is a real possibility that regulation will become 
fossilised at the EU level and will not be adaptable to the different 
situations pertaining in different EU countries in relation to, for 
example, different legal systems.
of course, there are possible benefits from the harmonisation 
of insurance regulation. The UK Treasury undertook a regulatory 
impact assessment of regulatory harmonisation under the EU’s 
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Solvency  II process that was published in 2008 (HM Treasury 
2008), though this was hardly rigorous. This assessment con-
cluded that there would be ongoing net benefits of £96.6 million a 
year in the UK from Solvency II, and that potential benefits might 
include the following:
• increased security for consumers;
• fewer distortions to trade;
• more transparency for investors, and therefore reduced cost 
of capital;
• the ability to use different strategies for risk mitigation 
without discrimination;
• more efficient use of capital resulting from the ability to 
exploit efficiencies for groups operating across the EU.
The Treasury assessment also pointed out that UK firms would 
benefit from the fact that the Financial Services Authority im-
poses both the current EU capital requirements (pre- Solvency II) 
as well as an approximation to the forthcoming capital require-
ments under Solvency  II. However, that is just an indication of 
how over-regulated UK insurers are currently, and not a justifica-
tion for uniform regulation or any particular level of regulation.
In the analysis, however, no consideration was given to the 
possibility that a much more liberal regime would still provide in-
centives for insurance companies to be transparent to providers 
of capital and manage their businesses in such a way that policy-
holders were protected – this was the basis of the ‘freedom with 
publicity’ approach that was so successful in the UK from 1870 
to 1970. It was assumed in HM Treasury (2008) that information 
asymmetries necessitated insurance regulation for consumer 
protection, and that benefits would flow from that. However, dur-
ing the century from 1870 to 1970, there were only two failures of 
insurance companies – neither of which harmed non-profit pol-
icyholders – despite there being no explicit capital requirements 
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for much of that period.15 Furthermore, there was no discussion 
in the document of the problems of removing regulatory compe-
tition, the problems of using a ‘one-size-fits-all’ regime, or of the 
potential for the fossilisation of the regulatory regime as a result 
of it being determined at the central EU level.16 There was also no 
discussion of the potential costs of the new EU regulatory regime 
imposing capital requirements that were too high in respect of 
certain types of activity, or of the costs of favouring particular 
asset classes such as sovereign bonds.
Other areas of EU financial regulation
The EU has been in the process of trying to unify all aspects of 
non-bank financial regulation for many decades. This process 
does not just apply to insurance business; it also applies to hedge 
funds, private equity, pension funds, rules to which quoted com-
panies must adhere, and so on. 
Since 2005, companies issuing equity have been required 
to produce information in line with the Prospectus Directive 
(amended in 2010). The Directive requires that all companies 
with new issues of shares traded on a regulated market have to 
meet EU-wide harmonised requirements in terms of the infor-
mation that they provide. This then provides a ‘passport’, which 
will allow shares to be traded on any regulated EU market, thus 
promoting a single market. 
This approach is predicated upon two errors. The first is the 
assumption that the government or a government financial 
regulator needs to determine the information that is put before 
15 See Booth (2007). It is a moot point exactly when capital requirements were brought 
in.
16 Although I do not approve of the changes to the regulatory regime that followed the 
Equitable Life crisis, the Financial Services Authority was able to react quickly. It 
is inconceivable that the central EU bureaucracy would react to events in a specific 
country within a decade, if at all.
Minford-Shackleton.indd   267 24/02/2016   14:42:54
BR E A K I NG U P I S H A R D To D o YoU NG, SI NGL E , BU T NOT F R E E
268
the market before an offer for sale of shares. Such things can be 
determined by the stock exchange, and exchanges can compete 
according to the effectiveness of the requirements they impose 
on companies. A well-managed exchange with appropriate 
requirements for companies and a high degree of confidence 
amongst investors will be attractive to investors and lower the 
cost of capital.17 Indeed, companies themselves have an incentive 
to provide the right sort of information to the market in order to 
lower their cost of capital. The second is that, even if the regula-
tion of company information is determined by the government, 
different requirements imposed by different governments do 
not intrinsically inhibit trade. Some governments may choose to 
have no information requirements at all except those imposed 
by exchanges; some governments may accept the prospectuses 
authorised by other EU member states; and some governments 
may have their own requirements. The only reason for the EU to 
be involved would be if governments imposed requirements on 
companies domiciled in one member country that were, in effect, 
protectionist, or if they prohibited companies domiciled in an-
other member country from seeking a listing or quotation on an 
exchange in their country.
There are several other Directives relating to ‘market abuse’, 
company transparency, the operation of markets (MiFID) and 
the compulsory application of accounting standards. More re-
cently, the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive has 
been implemented. This applies regulations to previously un-
regulated sectors such as private equity funds and hedge funds. 
The regulations apply both to funds established in the EU (even if 
managed outside the EU) and funds marketed in the EU (even if 
managed and/or established outside the EU). 
17 See Arthur and Booth (2010) for a discussion of this issue and Stringham (2015) for 
a comprehensive and original review of the literature.
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The extension of EU competencies in these areas is not neces-
sary for the free movement of capital or services, though it could 
be argued that it reduces the transactions costs of trade and re-
duces the costs of regulated entities complying with many differ-
ent regimes. Arguably, regulation in these areas is not required 
at all – as the UK historical experience suggests. Furthermore, 
there can be no ‘correct’ approach to regulation, and, therefore, 
a multiplicity of approaches may provide opportunities for ex-
perimentation and learning from different approaches. Given 
that EU regulation in these areas is not necessary to achieve the 
key objectives of the Union, and that the desirability of any reg-
ulation at all can be disputed, it would seem sensible to take a 
different approach and allow cooperation between EU countries 
that wished to unify their regulation: cooperation that could 
be extended outside the EU if desired. This approach will be 
expanded upon in the conclusion. 
Conclusion
In all sectors of financial services, there has been increased 
centralisation of regulation at the EU level, together with an 
increase in the general level of regulation. We should be very 
clear what this entails. The EU has, in effect, tried to reduce the 
transactions costs of trade by unifying regulation. However, if 
this process leads to higher levels of regulation or inappropri-
ate regulation, the costs of doing business, whether between 
or within countries, will be increased. As the EU develops its 
role in the financial sector further, there is no effective check 
on centralisation and increasing levels of regulation. A una-
nimity requirement for new regulation is probably necessary to 
achieve such a check.
If countries wish to obtain the additional advantages of uni-
fying regulatory systems in order to lower transactions costs, 
they can do that through intergovernmental agreements. This 
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is likely to be simplest amongst countries that have similar 
legal traditions, and it need not only involve EU countries. For 
example, there is no reason why the UK, Ireland, Canada, South 
Africa, Australia and New Zealand could not unify their insur-
ance regulatory systems. Alternatively, they can agree to recog-
nise each other’s regulatory systems following the principle of 
mutual recognition.
If Britain were to leave the EU, it could be argued that its 
financial services industry would lose the protection of the 
EU institutions when it came to promoting free trade with the 
other member countries: other countries could impose regula-
tion that raised the cost of UK firms doing business. However, 
against that, the UK would be free to develop its own regulatory 
system and negotiate agreements with other countries. The 
likely worst-case scenario is that UK companies undertaking 
business in the EU would have to establish subsidiaries abiding 
by EU regulation.
In summary, if the UK is to remain in the EU, the UK should 
demand reform along the following lines in order to promote an 
approach based on competitive federalism.
• All EU countries should be permitted to develop their own 
systems of insurance and securities market regulation.
• Any country that developed a system of regulation that 
distorted or impeded trade should be referred to the ECJ.
• Any pair or group of countries could freely choose to adopt 
the same systems of regulation, or mutually recognise each 
other’s systems so that a company domiciled in one of the 
countries party to the agreement could operate in another 
country through a branch under the regulation of the 
country of domicile. These arrangements could also be made 
by EU countries with non-EU countries.
• The EU could have its own central system of regulation, into 
which member states could opt, and individual companies 
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could opt if they wished. This would reduce business costs for 
larger entities operating in a number of EU countries.18
• An insurance company or other financial entity from any 
member state should be able to operate in another member 
state by establishing a subsidiary in that member state 
regulated by the receiving state. The subsidiary could, of 
course, buy services from other subsidiaries within the 
group. As such, for example, a UK insurance group could set 
up a subsidiary in Slovakia, the capital and sales practices 
of which would be regulated by the Slovakian government. 
However, the Slovakian company could be entirely serviced 
by the UK subsidiaries. Both the free movement of capital 
and of services would be achieved through this mechanism.
Under this scheme, harmonisation, insofar as it is desirable at 
all, can occur through agreement between member states with-
out being imposed from the centre.
This approach would enable free trade to be promoted with-
out unifying regulation. Transactions costs would be higher, but 
these could be ameliorated by bilateral or multilateral agree-
ments between member states and by the trading of services 
between subsidiaries under a holding company. Furthermore, 
multilateral agreements could be extended to non-EU countries. 
This approach would promote regulatory systems that respond-
ed to competitive pressure and allow best practice to be copied 
The same principles apply to securities markets and corporate 
governance and reporting regulation. Different countries having 
different rules regarding the contents of prospectuses, account-
ing standards and so on does not, in principle, inhibit trade. In-
deed, until 1986, such matters were not generally determined by 
government in the UK. Insofar as rules relating to such matters 
18 This is not unlike the US system, where states have the responsibility for regulation 
but nearly all states adopt the same model.
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are used for protectionist purposes by individual countries, they 
should be prohibited by the ECJ. The harmonisation of regulation 
at the EU level is neither necessary nor desirable. 
It is highly unlikely that the EU will evolve in a liberal direction 
that will allow the approach suggested above to be adopted. The 
UK can remain in the EU with, it would appear, ever-more-cen-
tralised and costly systems of regulation. Alternatively, the UK 
could leave the EU, liberalise its financial regulation and cooper-
ate with other countries that wish to promote free trade in finan-
cial services. The ideal, though, would be to return to a regulatory 
regime that was designed to promote the four freedoms within 
the EU and free trade outside. Unfortunately, that is not on offer. 
As noted, it should not be assumed that a return to the liberal 
regulatory regimes on which a successful, respected and prudent 
financial services industry was built in the UK is immediately on 
the political agenda domestically, even if the UK were to with-
draw from the EU. When it comes to financial regulation, the 
UK has moved a long way since the early 1980s, when it could 
point to a century-long liberal tradition, certainly with regard to 
non-banking financial services regulation (see Booth 2014). In-
deed, in some areas, it is the British government that has been 
pushing for more regulation at the EU level.
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